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INTRODUCTION
The statement of the facts, the jurisdictional statement and
the statement of the case are set forth in Appellant's Opening
Brief at page 1 and pages 3 through 11.

Jurisdiction has been

conferred on the Appellate Court pursuant to UCA section 78-2-2
(4) and 78-2a-3(2) (j) (1953 as amended), and Rule 42 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Appellant takes this opportunity to

respond to the arguments set forth in the respective briefs of the
two respondents.

The remaining arguments of the Appellant are

adequately covered in Appellant's Opening Brief.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

In a case involving alleged negligence for failure to

1

diagnose breast cancer, as a matter of law, is the mere natural
anger and suspicion, of a layman plaintiff

having no medical

background, that her diagnosing physician "screwed up," equivalent
to " knowledge" of the possibility that Plaintiff sustained an
injury due to negligent action on the part of her physician?
2.
favorable

Under the facts of this case, construed in a light most
to the Plaintiff, as a matter

of

law, should the

Plaintiff be construed to have had "constructive knowledge"
that she sustained an injury

due to negligence action on the

part of her diagnosing physician, more than two years prior to
commencing her action in this matter.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff's suspicion of a remote possibility of negligence
does not equate to the required finding that she had knowledge

of

the possibility that she had sustained an injury due to negligent
action on the part of the Defendants.

The Plaintiff has never

taken the position that the statute of limitations did not
begin to run until she received an expert opinion concerning the
possibility of negligence on the part of the Defendants.

In this

case, the Plaintiff had no meaningful information relating to the
possibility of negligence by the Defendants in failing to diagnose
her breast cancer, until she contacted her attorney in October
1988.
2

The court should find that there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the Plaintiff should have discovered
her legal injury prior to August of 1988.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:
THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE
POSSIBILITY THAT SHE HAD SUSTAINED AN INJURY
DUE TO NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE
DEFENDANTS, MORE THAN TWO YEARS PRIOR TO HER
COMMENCING HER ACTION IN THIS MATTER.
As

was

discussed

in

our

previous

brief, the test for

determining whether the statute of limitations should begin to run
is whether the Plaintiff had knowledge of or was aware of facts
that would

lead her to conclude there was a possibility of

negligence on the part of the Defendant doctors.

Deschamps v.

Pulley, 784 P.2d 471, 473-474 (Utah App. 1989).
There are three facts peculiar to this case that distinguish
it from all the other previous appellate cases

relating to the

issue of the running of the issue of the statute of limitations in
a medical malpractice law suit. They are as follows:
(1) This case is based upon negligence due to
failure to diagnose breast cancer rather than
upon negligence due to administering
affirmative medical care in a faulty manner;
(2) The Plaintiff in this case is a layman
with no medical background whatsoever;
(3)
The Plaintiff in this case, despite
exercising reasonable diligence in conducting

3

an investigation into the possibility of
negligence of the defendants, was unable to
obtain any helpful information concerning the
possibility of such negligence from any
source, prior to discussing the case with
her attorney in October 1988.
These facts should be given special consideration in determining
whether the statute of limitations began to run in this case
prior to the late summer of 1988.
In Foil v. Ballinqer,

601 P 2d 144, 147 (Utah 1979) the Utah

Supreme Court recognized that:
"In the health care field it is typically the
case that there is often a great disparity in
the knowledge of those who provide health care
services and those who receive the services
with respect to expected and unexpected side
effects of a given procedure, as well as the
nature, degree, and extent of expected after
effects. While the recipient may be aware of
a disability or a disfunction, there may be,
to the untutored understanding of the average
layman, no apparent connection between the
treatment provided by the physician and the
injuries suffered."
This is a case where the connection between the possible
negligence and the injury suffered is even more obscure to the
average layman.

The alleged negligence arose from ci failure to

diagnose,

rather

than

from

negligence

in administration of

treatment.

A causal connection between negligent medical care and

physical injury is certainly more obvious where treatment has been
positively rendered by some affirmative action and is thereafter
followed by an adverse medical condition which did not exist until
4

treatment was given.

In the case of a negligent diagnosis, the

connection between negligent medical care and physical injury may
never be recognized.

The Wyoming Supreme Court considered the

difficulty of making a causal connection between negligent medical
care

and physical

injury

in a situation

where the alleged

negligence was the failure to diagnose an affliction.
" In cases involving an undiagnosed affliction
especially, the patient may not discover the
wrong until so informed by another doctor: The
question of malpractice in a diagnostic
situation is often dependent upon when the
Plaintiff is informed by another physician
that the original diagnosis was wrong and
whether if a correct diagnosis had been made
and treatment rendered the ultimate result
would have changed. Moreover, the fact that
the Plaintiff obtains a correct diagnosis does
not necessarily constitute notice that the
earlier incorrect diagnosis was rendered
negligently."
Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P. 2d 414, 419 (Wyo. 1985).

In light of the

difficulty in determining whether negligence has taken place in a
case involving failure to diagnose a condition, it is absurd to
impute knowledge of such negligence in this case to the Plaintiff,
a layman with no medical background, unless the Plaintiff had
obtained some additional information that would tend to show that
the Defendants' failure to diagnose breast cancer in 1985 was
negligent behavior.
In this case, despite making inquiries to her other doctors
prior to receiving treatment of her cancer, the Plaintiff was

initially unable to obtain any helpful information relating to
whether the Defendants were negligent in failing to diagnose her
breast

cancer

prolonged

in April

of

1985.

Thereafter, because of

illness and stress brought on by the treatment and

possible recurrence of the breast cancer, the Plaintiff was unable
to continue her investigation until August or September 1988.
Shortly after resuming her investigation into the possibility of
negligence on the part of the Defendants, in October 1988, she
discussed her case with her attorney, who counseled her of a
possibility of negligence.
knowledge

or

awareness

Because the Plaintiff did not have

of

any helpful

inf ormation

or facts

relating to the possibility of negligence on the part of the
Defendants,

until

the

late

summer of

1988, the

statute of

limitations should not begin to run until the late summer of 1988.
The Defendants put much emphasis on the fact that in July of
1985, upon discovering that she had breast cancer, the Plaintiff
was angry towards the Defendants in this case and suspected that
there

was

a possibility

of

negligence

on the part

of the

Defendants in failing to diagnose her breast cancer in April of
1985. The Plaintiff stated that she was angry with the Defendants
and that she felt they had somehow "screwed up."

The Defendants

would have this court equate such "anger and suspicion" of the
Plaintiff with "knowledge" or "awareness" of facts that would lead
6

her to conclude there was a possibility of negligence on the part
of the Defendants.

However, it is obvious that the suspicion of

the possibility of negligence is present in every situation where
medical care does not produce the desired results.

Therefore, as

common

10 th Circuit

sense

Appellate

might

Court

lead

concluded

one

to

that

believe, the
the mere

suspicion

of

the

possibility of negligence by a defendant, or the mere existence
of the possibility that the Plaintiff had factual knowledge of the
possibility of negligence by a defendant, is not enough to begin
the running of the statute of limitations against the Plaintiff.
See, Vest v. Bossard, 700 F.2d 600, 604 (Utah, 10th Cir. 1983).
This court should also follow principles of common sense and sound
legal reasoning and conclude that mere suspicion or anger about
the possibility of negligence does not equate with knowledge or
awareness of facts that would lead the Plaintiff to conclude that
there was a possibility of negligence.
Plaintiff

in her Opening Appellate Brief argued that the

possibilities of medical negligence for which Plaintiff should be
accountable

and

those which

should

trigger

the

statute of

limitations to run are "reasonable" possibilities, not "remote"
ones.

The Defendants have argued that this position is not

supported

by

reasonableness

the

law.

However,

as the standard

the

law

of behavior
7

always

requires

in any situation.

Furthermore, because the practice of medicine is not an exact
science, there is always a "remote" possibility that a medical
professional has been negligent
produce the expected results.
of medical negligence

when his medical care does not

Moreover, if a "remote" possibility

was sufficient grounds for legal action, a

claimant would be deemed to have knowledge of the possibility of
negligence at the time he obtained knowledge of the physical
injuries.

There would be no reason for the Utah courts to have

ruled that:
"Under Foil, the statutory 2-year limitations
period does not commence to run until the
injured person (1) knows or should know that
she has sustained an injury, and (2) knows or
should know that this injury was caused by
negligence."
Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d at 473. If all that was required was
a remote possibility of negligence a claimant would be deemed to
have knowledge

of

the possibility

of negligence when

he had

knowledge that he had sustained a physical injury, and the second
prong of the Foil test would thus become meaningless and useless.
Therefore, again, both common sense and sound legal reasoning
require

that the possibility

Plaintiff
statute

should
of

of medical negligence

be accountable

limitations

to

run

and which would
should

be

a

for which

trigger the
"reasonable"

possibility of negligence, not merely a "remote" possibility of
negligence.
8

In addition, the Defendant has argued that the Plaintiff had
exactly the same information in the late summer and early fall of
1988 that she had in July 1985, and had obtained no additional
information relating to the possibility of negligence on the part
of

the Defendants

between July 1985 and October 1988.

This

statement is true in part, because the Plaintiff did not have any
additional information relating to the possibility of negligence
from July 1985 to October 1988.

This was due to the fact that

within a week or two after discovering that she had breast cancer,
the Plaintiff had an operation to remove her breast and then began
chemotherapy treatments to treat the cancer.
chemotherapy

treatments

ended

in February

Even after the

1986, the Plaintiff

continued to suffer devastating side effects from her surgery and
chemotherapy.
immune

Among other things, Plaintiff lost her hair and her

system

Plaintiff

ceased

to

function

constantly suffered

normally.

Consequently,

from illnesses, chronic weakened

physical condition and continuous mental and emotional distress
until late summer 1988.
and

subsequent

The Plaintiff's continuous poor health

concomitant

stresses,

in

addition

to

her

preoccupation with the foreseeable reoccurrence of the cancer,
rendered the plaintiff unable to work or rationally investigate
the possibility that Dr. Farr and Dr. Christensen were negligent
in

failing

to

diagnose

her

breast
9

cancer, until August or

September of 1988.

Therefore, the Plaintiff's ability to conduct

a reasonable investigation into the possibility of negligence on
the part of the Defendants was effectively destroyed until August
or September 1988.

Shortly thereafter, the Plaintiff did resume

her investigation of the possibility of negligence on the part of
the Defendants in this matter.

In October 1988, she consulted her

Attorney, Douglas M. Durbano, and obtained a preliminary opinion
that there was a possibility of negligence on the part of the
Defendants in this matter.

Thus, in October 1988, the Plaintiff

did obtain information in addition to the information she had in
her possession in July 1985.

Again, these facts dictate that the

statute of limitations in this case should not begin to run until
the late summer of 1988.
Finally, the Defendants misconstrue the Plaintiff's position
in this matter, in representing that the Plaintiff has taken the
legal position that she should not be construed to have discovered
her

legal

injury

until

she

had

received

an expert opinion

regarding negligence from either a doctor or a lawyer in this
case.

The Plaintiff has never taken the position that she could

not know of her legal injury until she received an expert medical
opinion or legal opinion confirming malpractice.

The fact remains

that the Plaintiff did not have any information relating to the
possibility of negligence on the part of the Defendant from any
10

source until she talked with her attorney in October 1988.

If she

had obtained any helpful and relevant information relating to the
possibility of negligence on the part of the Defendants before
September

1988, that information would

have been relevant in

determining whether the statute of limitations began to run at an
earlier date.

The fact that the first information received by the

Plaintiff relating to the possibility of negligence on the part of
the Defendants came from her attorney does not somehow make the
court's ruling in Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P. 2d 471 (Utah App.
1989),

that

an

expert

malpractice is not required

medical

opinion

regarding

medical

to begin the running of the statute

of limitations, relevant to this case in some distorted way.
POINT II
A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS AS TO
W H E T H E R PLAINTIFF HAD
"CONSTRUCTIVE
KNOWLEDGE" OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT SHE HAD
SUSTAINED AN INJURY DUE TO NEGLIGENT ACTION
ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS, MORE THAN TWO
YEARS PRIOR TO COMMENCING HER ACTION IN THIS
MATTER.
As has been argued above, the Plaintiff did not have the
"knowledge" of or an "awareness" of facts that would lead her to
believe that there was a possibility of negligence on the part of
the Defendants, until October of 1988.

However, the Plaintiff

concedes that as of July of 1985, she did have knowledge of facts
which would create an obligation on her part to inquire into the
11

possibility of negligence.

U.C.A. Section 78-12-14(1) states in

relevant part:
"No malpractice action against a health care
provider may be brought unless it is
commenced within two years after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through
the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered the injury, whichever first
occurs, but not to exceed four years after
the date of the alleged act, omission,
neglect or occurrence...." [Emphasis added.]
The

key

issue

in

this

case, therefore, is whether the

Plaintiff, through the use of reasonable diligence, should have
obtained knowledge of facts that would lead her to conclude that
there

was

a possibility

of

negligence

Defendants prior to October of 1988.
evidence

to

the

trial

court

on the part

of the

The Plaintiff did submit

alleging

that

she conducted a

reasonable inquiry into the possibility of negligence on the part
of the Defendants.

Therefore, the real issue before* the court,

which is actually a factual issue to be determined by the trierof-fact,

is whether

it was

reasonable

for the Plaintiff

to

discontinue her inquiry into the possibility of negligence on the
part of the Defendants, from August of 1985 until August of 1988,
during the period in which she was suffering from the side effects
of her cancer and the treatment for her cancer, and before she
could

resume her normal activities

in August

of

1988.

The

Defendants have not controverted the evidence presented by the
12

Plaintiff on this issue.

Moreover, the reasonableness of the

Plaintiff's inquiry into the possibility of negligence on the part
of the Defendants is a factual issue, which should be determined
only by the trier-of-fact in this case.

Therefore, it was error

on the part of the trial court to conclude that the statute of
limitations

barred

Plaintiff's

Complaint

in this case.

The

appellate court should remand this case to the trial court to
conduct a bifurcated trial on the issue of statute of limitations
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-47.
CONCLUSION
The suspicions and anger held by the Plaintiff towards the
Defendants

in

this action, that

such Defendants

should have

diagnosed Plaintiff's cancer in April of 1985, do not in and of
themselves, standing alone, constitute knowledge or awareness on
the part of the Plaintiff of facts sufficient to lead her to
conclude there was a possibility of negligence on the part of the
Defendants in this case.

Therefore, it was error on the part of

the trial court to rule as a matter of law that such suspicions
and anger are equivalent to "knowledge" of facts that would lead
Plaintiff to conclude there was a possibility of negligence on the
part of the Defendants.

In addition, a genuine factual issue

exists as to whether the Plaintiff used reasonable diligence in
conducting an inquiry into the possibility that the failure of the
13

Defendants

to

diagnose

her

cancer

constituted

Therefore, because an issue of material

negligence.

fact existed

in this

case, it was error on the part of the trial court to rule as a
matter of law that the statute of limitations barred Plaintiff's
action in this case.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff requests the

Appellate Court to reverse the order of summary judgment of the
trial court, and further requests that she be awarded her court
costs and attorney's fees incurred in appealing this matter.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /0*^

day of September, 1990.
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